Agenda

Economics Seminars are study seminars held on current research proposals or on studies carried out by eminent international researchers and teachers. They are an opportunity for discussion of new theories, developments, models and debates, focussing on various current economics topics.

Economics Seminars are generally held on Mondays at 12:15 in Meeting Room 1 (Complex A – San Giobbe Economics Campus – map).

Upcoming event:

Elias Carroni (University of Bologna) “Persuasion in Physician Agency”, coautori: Giuseppe Pignataro e Luigi Siciliani

Abstract: 
The economic incentives of physicians when recommending medical treatments constitute an important agency problem in health care. In this paper, a patient experiences symptoms of an illness and visits a physician, who recommends the treatment or not based on the results of a personalized  (combination of) test(s), which can deliver a signal of health or of illness that changes the beliefs of the patient. The test is chosen by the physician, whose payoff depends on the payment for each treatment performed, on the  treatment cost and on the testing cost. We show that at equilibrium there are three categories of patients. Compared to the first best of no uncertainty, there is  a health loss as wel as a welfare loss. Patients with extreme preferences towards the treatment do not receive a test. Among them, those who are reluctant against a treatment refraining from treatment, whereas those inclined take the treatment. Differently, patients with intermediate preferences receive a test and take unnecessary treatment with positive probability. We discuss some policy interventions aiming at improving health and  welfare.