Agenda

03 Mar 2025 12:15

Ed Hopkins (King's College London)

Meeting Room 1, San Giobbe Economics Campus

Ed Hopkins (King's College London) - The Evolution of a Conscience in Repeated Games under Limited Self-Control

Abstract:
This paper investigates the evolution of preferences in repeated games, where there is simultaneous selection over the equilibrium played and the mix of preferences and non-cognitive abilities that support it. Limited commitment is assumed so that cooperation is partial and this can worsened by limited self-control. First, it is shown that, under the assumption of symmetry in play, social/moral preferences, a "conscience", are selected for in repeated social dilemmas more easily than in static games. Further, social/moral preferences and greater self-control are shown to be complements in improving cooperation, whereas social/moral preferences and patience are substitutes. Thus, it is shown a mix of social/moral preferences and self-control will be stable under evolutionary dynamics, while the mix with patience will be unstable.

Lingua

L'evento si terrà in inglese

Organizzatore

Department of Economics (EcSeminars)

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