Agenda

Elshan Garashli (University of Graz)

Abstract: There are multiple biased agents (senders) who have correlated private information and an institution (receiver) that would benefit from their private information to make a decision. The senders communicate via cheap talk with the receiver. We extend the classical model by Crawford and Sobel (1982) to multiple senders with heterogeneous biases and correlated private information. We find out that with a large number of senders, more information is transmitted if the correlation level increases. Furthermore, we get full revelation under perfect correlation. In the case of independent random variables, every sender’s partition depends only on her own bias and on the exogenous weight of her information.

The seminar can be attended also remotely, connecting to ZOOM.
Link Zoom: bit.ly/InseminarsDEC
ID riunione: 833 1615 8636
Passcode: In-Sem23