Sergio CURRARINI

Qualifica
Professore Associato
Telefono
041 234 9133 / 041 234 6654
E-mail
currarin@unive.it
SSD
Economia politica [ECON-01/A]
Sito web
www.unive.it/persone/currarin (scheda personale)
 https://sites.google.com/a/unive.it/s-currarini/
Struttura
Dipartimento di Economia
Sito web struttura: https://www.unive.it/dip.economia
Sede: San Giobbe
Struttura
Centro Interdipartimentale "Scuola Interdipartimentale in Economia, Lingue e Imprenditorialità per gli Scambi Internazionali"
Sito web struttura: https://www.unive.it/selisi
Sede: Treviso - Palazzo San Paolo

Pubblicazioni

Anno Tipologia Pubblicazione
Anno Tipologia Pubblicazione
2023 Articolo su rivista Currarini, Sergio; Feri, Francesco; Hartig, Bjoern; Meléndez-Jiménez, Miguel A. Transmission and use of information in network games in EUROPEAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, vol. 155 (ISSN 0014-2921)
DOI - Scheda ARCA: 10278/5063803
2022 Articolo su rivista Currarini, S.; Marchiori, C. Issue linkage in GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, vol. 135, pp. 16-40 (ISSN 0899-8256)
DOI - Scheda ARCA: 10278/5063802
2021 Articolo su rivista Currarini, Sergio; Feri, Francesco Information Sharing in Oligopoly: Sharing Groups and Core-Periphery Architectures in GAMES, vol. 12 (ISSN 2073-4336)
DOI - Scheda ARCA: 10278/5063801
2020 Articolo su rivista Currarini, Sergio; Ursino, Giovanni; Chand, A K S Strategic Transmission of Correlated Information in ECONOMIC JOURNAL, vol. 130, pp. 2175-2206 (ISSN 0013-0133)
DOI - Scheda ARCA: 10278/3752887
2018 Articolo su libro Sergio Currarini Francesco Feri Information Sharing in Oligopoly in Sergio Currarini, Francesco Feri, Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial Organization, Edward Elgar Publishing, vol. 18, pp. 520-536 (ISBN 9781785363276)
DOI - URL correlato - Scheda ARCA: 10278/3735123
2017 Articolo su rivista Currarini, Sergio; Fumagalli, Elena; Panebianco, Fabrizio Peer effects and local congestion in networks in GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, vol. 105, pp. 40-58 (ISSN 0899-8256)
DOI - URL correlato - Scheda ARCA: 10278/3699350
2016 Articolo su rivista Currarini, Sergio; Matheson Jesse, Vega Redondo Fernando A simple model of homophily in social networks in EUROPEAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, vol. 90, pp. 18-39 (ISSN 0014-2921)
DOI - URL correlato - Scheda ARCA: 10278/3687050
2016 Articolo su rivista Currarini, Sergio; Mengel, Friederike Identity, homophily and in-group bias in EUROPEAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, vol. 90, pp. 40-55 (ISSN 0014-2921)
DOI - URL correlato - Scheda ARCA: 10278/3687052
2016 Articolo su rivista Currarini, Sergio; Marchiori, Carmen; Tavoni, Alessandro Network Economics and the Environment: Insights and Perspectives in ENVIRONMENTAL & RESOURCE ECONOMICS, vol. 65, pp. 159-189 (ISSN 0924-6460)
DOI - Scheda ARCA: 10278/3661530
2014 Articolo su rivista Sergio Currarini; Marco Marini Coalitional Approaches to Collusive Agreements in Oligopoly in MANCHESTER SCHOOL, vol. -, pp. 1-35 (ISSN 1463-6786)
DOI - Scheda ARCA: 10278/44435
2014 Articolo su rivista Sergio Currarini; Francesco Feri Information Sharing in Linear Quadratic Games in INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY, vol. -, pp. --- (ISSN 0020-7276)
DOI - Scheda ARCA: 10278/44434
2012 Articolo su rivista CURRARINI S.; BRAMOUILLE Y.; JACKSON M.; PIN P.; ROGERS B. Homophily and Long Run Integration in Social Networks in JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, vol. 145, pp. 1754-1786 (ISSN 0022-0531)
DOI - Scheda ARCA: 10278/29322
2012 Articolo su rivista Sergio Currarini; Marco Marini Majority Rules and Coalitional Stability in ECONOMICS BULLETIN, vol. 33, pp. 1660-1668 (ISSN 1545-2921)
- Scheda ARCA: 10278/39713
2012 Articolo su rivista Sergio Currarini; Marco Marini On the Eect of Premia and Penalties on Optimal Portfolio Choice in INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY MATHEMATICAL SCIENCES, vol. 7, pp. 2341-2344 (ISSN 1312-7586)
- URL correlato - Scheda ARCA: 10278/36294
2012 Articolo su rivista Sergio Currarini; Marco Marini Sequential Play and Cartel Stability in Cournot Oligopoly in APPLIED MATHEMATICAL SCIENCES, vol. 7, pp. 197-200 (ISSN 1312-885X)
DOI - Scheda ARCA: 10278/36004
2011 Articolo su rivista Currarini S.; Marini M. Kinked Norms of Behaviour and Cooperation in ECONOMICS LETTERS, vol. 110, pp. 223-225 (ISSN 0165-1765)
DOI - Scheda ARCA: 10278/4263
2011 Working paper S. CURRARINI; M. MARINI Coalitional Approaches to Collusive Agreements in Oligopoly Games , vol. link esterno
- Scheda ARCA: 10278/29123
2011 Working paper S. CURRARINI; M.O. JACKSON; P. PIN Long-Run Integration in Social Networks , vol. link esterno
- Scheda ARCA: 10278/27510
2010 Articolo su rivista S. CURRARINI; MATT. O. JACKSON; PAOLO PIN Identifying the roles of race-based choice and chance in high school friendship network formation in PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Editore National Academy of Sciences a Washington, DC, vol. 107, pp. 4857-4861 (ISSN 1091-6490)
- Scheda ARCA: 10278/32288
2010 Working paper S. Currarini; F. Vega Redondo Search and Homophily in Social Networks , vol. doi:10.2139/ssrn.1697503
- Scheda ARCA: 10278/30734
2009 Articolo su rivista CURRARINI S.; MATTHEW O. JACKSON; PAOLO PIN An Economic Model of Frienship: Homophily, Minorities and Segregation in ECONOMETRICA, vol. 77(4), pp. 1003-1045 (ISSN 0012-9682)
- Scheda ARCA: 10278/29459
2008 Altro CURRARINI S.; FRANCESCO FERI Information Sharing Networks in Oligopoly , vol. 16/WP/2008, pp. 1-35, 2008
- Scheda ARCA: 10278/19631
2007 Articolo su rivista CURRARINI S. Group Stability of Hierarchies in Games with Spillovers in MATHEMATICAL SOCIAL SCIENCES, vol. 54(3), pp. 187-202 (ISSN 0165-4896)
- Scheda ARCA: 10278/30758
2007 Articolo su rivista CURRARINI S. Network Design in Games with Spillovers in REVIEW OF ECONOMIC DESIGN, vol. 10(4),, pp. 305-326 (ISSN 1434-4742)
- Scheda ARCA: 10278/18602
2007 Altro CURRARINI S.; MATT JACKSON; PAOLO PIN An Economic Model of Friendship: Homophily, Minorities and Segregation" , vol. 20/WP/2007, pp. 1-47, 2007
- Scheda ARCA: 10278/18607
2007 Altro CURRARINI S.; FRANCESCO FERI Bilateral Information Sharing in Oligopoly , vol. 21/WP/2007, pp. 1-21, 2007
- Scheda ARCA: 10278/19630
2006 Articolo su rivista CURRARINI S.; M. MARINI Coalitional Stability in Games Without Synergies in INTERNATIONAL GAME THEORY REVIEW, vol. 8(1), pp. 1-16 (ISSN 0219-1989)
- Scheda ARCA: 10278/11590
2006 Articolo su rivista CURRARINI S.; FERI F Delegation versus Centralization: the role of externalities in RESEARCH IN ECONOMICS, vol. 60(2), pp. 112-119 (ISSN 1090-9443)
- Scheda ARCA: 10278/11628
2005 Articolo su rivista CURRARINI S. Voting on Federations in RESEARCH IN ECONOMICS, vol. 59, pp. 1-21 (ISSN 1090-9443)
- Scheda ARCA: 10278/11627
2004 Articolo su libro CURRARINI S.; MARINI M A Conjectural Cooperative Equilibrium for Strategic Form Games in CARRARO C.; FRAGNELLI V., Game Practice and the Environment, LONDON, Edgar Edgar
- Scheda ARCA: 10278/18605
2004 Articolo su libro CURRARINI S.; TULKENS H Stable International Agreements on Transfrontier Pollution under Ratification Constraints in CARRARO C.; FRAGNELLI V., Game Practice and the Environment, LONDON, Edgar Edgar
- Scheda ARCA: 10278/18606
2003 Articolo su libro CURRARINI S.; MARINI M. A Sequential Approach to the Characteristic Function and the Core in Games with Externalities in SERTEL M.; KORAY S., Advances in Economic Design, Springer-Verlag, pp. 233-250
- Scheda ARCA: 10278/10470
2003 Altro CURRARINI S. On the Stability of Hierarchies in Games with Externalities , vol. 19.2003
- Scheda ARCA: 10278/4900
2002 Articolo su rivista CURRARINI S.; BLOISE G.; KIKIDIS N. Inflation, Welfare and Public Goods in JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMIC THEORY, vol. 4(3), pp. 369-386 (ISSN 1097-3923)
- Scheda ARCA: 10278/11588
2002 Articolo su rivista CURRARINI S. Voting on Public Goods in Multi-jurisdictional Systems in RESEARCH IN ECONOMICS, vol. 56, pp. 215-230 (ISSN 1090-9443)
- Scheda ARCA: 10278/11589
2002 Altro CURRARINI S. Stable Organizations with Externalities , vol. 51-2002
- Scheda ARCA: 10278/4898
2000 Articolo su rivista CURRARINI S.; MORELLI M. Network Formation with Sequential Demands in REVIEW OF ECONOMIC DESIGN, vol. 5(3), pp. 229-249 (ISSN 1434-4742)
- Scheda ARCA: 10278/28477
1999 Monografia o trattato scientifico CURRARINI S. Voting, Equilibrium and the Core of Economies with Public Goods , LOUVAIN-LA-NEUVE, CIACO
- Scheda ARCA: 10278/7754
1997 Altro CURRARINI S.; TULKENS H. Core Theoretic and Political Stability of International Agreements on Environmental Standards , vol. 9793
- Scheda ARCA: 10278/4899

Pubblicazioni scelte