Agenda

22 Jan 2025 12:15

Federico Innocenti - Information Design with Frame Choice

Meeting Room 1, San Giobbe Economics Campus + online

Federico Innocenti (University of Verona)

Abstract:

We study how framing interplays with information design. Whereas Sender conceives all contingencies separately, Receiver cannot initially distinguish among some of them, i.e., has a coarse frame. To influence Receiver's behavior, Sender first decides whether to refine Receiver’s frame and then designs an information structure for the chosen frame. Sender faces a trade-off between keeping Receiver under the coarse frame---thus concealing part of the information structure---and re-framing---hence inducing Receiver to revise preferences and prior beliefs after telling apart initially indistinguishable contingencies. Sender benefits from re-framing if this enhances persuasion possibilities or makes persuasion unnecessary. Compared to classical information design, Receiver's frame becomes more critical than preferences and prior beliefs in shaping the optimal information structure. Although a coarse worldview may open the doors to Receiver's exploitation, re-framing can harm Receiver in practice, thus questioning the scope of disclosure policies.

The seminar can be attended also remotely, connecting to ZOOM.

Link Zoom: bit.ly/insem-2425
ID riunione:  880 2639 9452
Passcode: InSem-2425

Language

The event will be held in English

Organized by

Department of Economics (InSeminars)

Link

http://bit.ly/insem-2425

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