Agenda

22 Gen 2025 12:15

Federico Innocenti - Whatever It Takes: a Good Communication Strategy?

Meeting Room 1, San Giobbe Economics Campus + online

Federico Innocenti (University of Verona)

Abstract:

Central banks provide information strategically to economic agents to influence their behavior. Interests are often aligned, but economic agents are inattentive to too complex information. What is, then, the best disclosure policy for a central bank? We study a Bayesian persuasion model to answer this question. The answer depends on the magnitude of the shocks. When shocks are weak, the central bank provides partially informative signals given the constraint of the household's inattention. Instead, when shocks are strong, the central bank does not provide information unless households are too optimistic or pessimistic. Crucially, the central bank uses information as an instrument to manage the inflation surprise and, thus, counter shocks.

The seminar can be attended also remotely, connecting to ZOOM.

Link Zoom: bit.ly/insem-2425
ID riunione:  880 2639 9452
Passcode: InSem-2425

Lingua

L'evento si terrà in inglese

Organizzatore

Department of Economics (InSeminars)

Link

http://bit.ly/insem-2425

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